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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

:

Case No*
14650

:

KENNETH L. ANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal proceeding in which Kenneth
L. Anderson was charged with the Crime of Automobile
Homicide in violation of Section 76-5-207 of the Utah
Statutes Annotated (as amended 1973).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried without a jury before the
Honorable Allen B. Sorenson, District Judge, on May 12,
1976 and was found guilty as charged.

Appellant was

sentenced to serve the indeterminate term of 0-5 years in
the Utah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have appellant's conviction
affirmed*
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 29, 1976, at about 3:00 a.m., appellant
was driving a Chevrolet pickup truck north on State Road
214 in Utah County (T-9).

At the same time a Toyota

pick-up truck was driving south on the same highway.
Appellant's vehicle, traveling approximately 55-60 miles
per hour (T-34,48) crossed over a safety island and into
the approaching Toyota's lane. Appellant then swerved
back towards his own lane and struck the Toyota head-on
in the center of the highway (T-27,2S and State's Exhibit
#11).

Mrs* Sherry Lynn Forsythe was killed instantly

as a result of the collision.

While the Toyota applied

its brakes and skidded, there is no evidence that appellant
applied his brakes prior to the collision (T-28) .
At trial appellant stipulated that his blood was
found to contain 0.22 per cent alcohol (T-4) shortly
after the accident*
A highway patrol officer asked appellant if he was
the driver of the Chevrolet and he answered affirmatively
(T-13).

The officer also testified that another individual

was on the passenger side of the Chevrolet, that that
individual was bleeding and that there was a great deal
of blood on the passenger side (T-44).

Appellant had only

minor cutsDigitized
(T-4
6)Howard
. W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
by the
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
AMPLE EVIDENCE WAS RECEIVED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE
TO SUSTAIN APPELLANT'S CONVICTION,
Appellant was charged with the crime of Automobile
Homicide in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (as
amended 1974):
"Criminal homicide constitutes
automobile homicide if the actor,
while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. . . to a degree which renders
the actor incapable of safely driving
a vehicle, causes the death of
another by operating a motor vehicle in
a negligent manner."
On appeal appellant contends that two elements of the
above statute were not supported with sufficient evidence
to justify a conviction.

He claims that there is in-

sufficient evidence that he was "operating a motor vehicle"
and that he did not "operate a motor vehicle in a
negligent manner".

Further, appellant contends that the

word "negligent" in the above statute requires a showing
of criminal negligence.

Respondent submits that there

is sufficient evidence to convict

appellant and that the

statute requires only a showing of simple negligence to
justify a conviction.
A.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (as amended 1974)

requires only a showing of simple negligence.
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Were it not for appellant's appeal, respondent
would have considered it obviously clear and long settled
in the State of Utah that a showing of simple negligence will satisfy the requirements of the Automobile Homicide
Statute.

A short examination of judicial decisions and

rules of statutory construction will suffice to demonstrate
the fact.
In 1957 the Utah Legislature passed an Automobile
Homicide Statute that was almost identical to the present
statute.

(Laws of Utah 1957, Chap. 165). However,

in place of the present language ". . . operating a motor
vehicle in a negligent manner", the 1957 law read "operating
or driving any automobile. • . in a reckless, negligent or
careless manner, or with wanton or reckless disregard
of human life or safety. . . . "

The meaning of this earlier

language was construed by the Utah Supreme Court, four
years later, in Utah v. Johnson, 12 Utah 2d 220, 364
P.2d 1019 (1961).

The Court said that the latter phrase

("with wanton or reckless disregard of human life") is
the generally accepted meaning of criminal negligence but
that the former phrase ("in a reckless, negligent or careless manner") is considered to mean only ordinary or simple
negligence (364 P.2d at 1019).

Thus, the Court held

the statute was satisfied by a showing of either criminal

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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or simple negligence*

This holJirij wr.i-; affirmed as

recently as 197 4 in State v. Risk, 520 P.2d 215

(Utah

197^j.
•• ) , ine Utah Legislature amended the

3:

Automobile Homicide Statute by deleting the phrase
"or xvith wanton or reckless disregard of human life."
(Laws of Utah, 1973, Chap. 1 9 6 ) .
1973 the statute read "

In other words, after

operating a motor vehicle in

a rec\<-!; ;. negligent oi careless manner," and thus required
only a showing of what tl i;> Utah Supreme Court had previously
termed "simple negligence."
!•-.• ; egislature is presumed to be aware of
judicial construction of its statutory terms.
a very w e n

-••-..•

Therefore,

ub"» of si-j t uhoivy construction requires

that when a legislature uses a term, in an enactment which
has previously been construed judic;
nro3u.

.

i

intended the term u

u x^ji&ia -;rp
retain the meaning

given by '• /uit previous judicial constructior
i. ale in u''; • H , Greenhalgh
(Utah L5:'

. * ,;,ayson City,

^-.i.-rh

^

-s w^l 1 as most jurisdictions.

- . .•„ ,•' *

State v. Govorko, 23 Ar.iz. An*-. 3Pn, s33 P. 2d
and

^£il,.y.- Chapman, 8 5 Wash . .••,--•••;

see

6?.?> '•-

P.°d

8J3

-

* i^ /5) ) .

Therefore,, we must find that the Utah Legislature intended
that a showing of simple ru-o"! V-IC-P '
vi.^^r

: J,

-i;o;:-\.

'ovicide

J

•

.-*:..-:..•

Statute.
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o convict

In 1974 the statute was again amended when
the legislature substituted "in a negligent manner11
for "in a reckless, negligent or careless manner."
(See Compiler's Notes, in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207
(1975 Pocket Supp.).

Thus we must presume that the

legislature meant to affirm again their concurrance in the
judicial interpretation of the statutory language.

As

the Court said in State v. Johnson, supra;
" . . . the legislation must be
read in the light of its clear
language and import. . . . "
364 P.2d at 1019.
Therefore:
11

. . . a death caused by simple .negligence committed by a driver
while under the influence of liquor,
is an offense within the contemplation
of the statute." 364 P.2d at 1020.
As additional support for respondent's position,
it should be pointed out that the Utah Automobile Homicide
Statute was lifted almost bodily and verbatim from the
Colorado Statutes.
at 1020).

(State v. Johnson, supra, 364 P.2d

Appellant would argue the criminal negligence

section, but that always existed and did not change
anyway.

After the Colorado legislature passed the statute,

but before Utah adopted it, the Colorado Supreme Court
twice interpreted it as above, that is, only requiring
simple negligence.

(See Kinehart v. People, 105 Colo.

123, 95 P.2d 10 (1939), and Kallnback v. People, 125
Colo. 144, 242 P.2d 222 (1952)).

As the Utah Supreme Court
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"It is almost axiomatic that
the judicial interpretation of legislation by the courts of a state from
which a statute is borrowed, merits
considerable dignity and weight in our
own judicial construction of the
borrowed enactment, and that our courts
ordinarily will consider that our
legislature passed the law with the
judicial interpretation given it by
the highest court of the sister state,
as a traveling companion attending
the local legislation." 364 P.2d
at 1020.
Therefore, since the Colorado courts

construe the

statute as requiring only simple negligence, and since
the Utah Legislature adopted the Colorado statute, the Utah
Courts should

presume that the Utah Legislature intended

the Colorado interpretation (State v. Johnson, supra,
364 P.2d at 1020).
In summation then, respondent submits that the
standard which would suffice to sustain a conviction of
Automobile Homicide is simple and not criminal negligence.
The Utah and Colorado Courts have so construed the
statute and we must presume that the legislature intended such a construction.
B•

Appellant's conviction should be affirmed

even if the standard is criminal negligence.
Respondent submits that the Utah Automobile Homicide
Statute requires no more than simple negligence, however,
even if the standard were higher, appellant's conviction

-7-
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should still be affirmed since his actions were so grossly
negligent as to constitute wanton, reckless, or marked
disregard of human life or safety, which in Utah is the
definition of criminal negligence.

(See State v. Clark,

223 P.2d 184 (Utah 1950, and numerous-cases cited therein).
Two items of evidence are very clear. First,
appellant stipulated that his blood contained .22%
alcohol (T-4,5).

This is over twice the level of

pre-

sumptive intoxication and indicates that appellant was
grossly drunk at the time of the accident. A highway
patrol officer testified that it was "very obvious"
appellant was intoxicated (T-15), because he smelled
strongly of alcohol, and he couldn't hardly walk or stand
(T~36).

Second, for the last few seconds prior to the

collision appellant was in the wrong, or on-coming lane
of traffic.

A highway patrol officer testified that

appellant left his lane at a point 360 feet from the
point of collision.

Appellant then cut back toward his

own land and collided with the victim's automobile in the
safety island (T-27, 28 and State1 s Exhibit #11).

The

officer further testifedd that appellant was going
somewhere between 55 and 60 miles per hour (T~48) and that
there were no skidmarks or any other evidence of appellant
having applied his brakes prior to the collision (T-28).

-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The law in Utah is very clear that both the
act of driving under the influence of alcohol and that of
driving on the wrong side of the road constitute
criminal negligence.

Therefore, even if the Automobile

Homicide Statute does require criminal negligence
(Respondent still contends it does not) there is still
more than sufficient evidence to convict appellant*
This Court said in State v. Capps, 176 P.2d
873 (Utah 1947):
"It is our opinion that a
person who drives a car while
[intoxicated] is reckless and
evinces a marked disregard for
the safety of others and is therefore guilty of criminal negligence,"
(at 874) .
Many other jurisdictions have held similarly.

In

Michigan the Court said:
"It is gross and culpable
negligence for a drunken man to
guide and operate an automobile
upon a public highway. . . . It
was criminal carelessness to do so.
. . ." (People v. Townsend, 183
N.W. 177 (Mich. 1921).
This holding was later affirmed in People v. Layman,
299 Mich. 141, 299 N.W. 840 (1941).

The Iowa Supreme

Court held similarly in State v. Kellison, 11 N.W. 2d 371
(Iowa 1943).

That case also gives authority form

numerous other jurisdictions on the point.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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As to driving on the wrong side of the
road, the Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Riddle, 112 Utah
356, 188 P.2d 449 (1948) said that whether or not it is
criminally negligent to drive on the wrong side of the
road depends on the circumstances.

In the Riddle case

the court, however, found the defendant guilty of criminal
negligence because he:
,f

. . . permits his automobile to
get onto the left side of the road,
and fails to see an automobile
approaching in a lawful manner from
the opposite direction." (188 P.2d
at 453).
In other words, the Riddle court found the defendant
guilty of criminal negligence for doing exactly the same
thing as appellant did.

That result was later affirmed

in State v. Clark, 223 P.2d 184 (Utah 1950) where another
defendant was held to have been criminally negligent
in allowing his car to cross onto the left portion of the
road as traffic approached.
Respondent therefore submits that appellant was
criminally negligent and that his conviction should be
affirmed.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN
ACCEPTING THE ADMISSION OF APPELLANT.
Before appellant could be convicted of the
crime of automobile homicide, it was necessary to show
that he was driving at the time of the accident.

At

the scene of the collision a highway patrolman asked
appellant if he was the driver of the Chevrolet truck.
Appellant responded affirmatively (T.13).

At trial,

the officer testified to this admission, over
appellant's objection, before any corroborating
proof of the fact had been received.

Appellant claims

that this is reversible error.
A trial court is endowed with broad discretion in managing a trial and the order in which
evidence is received.

The Utah Supreme Court in the

case of State v. Pollock, 102 Utah 587, 129 P.2d 554
(1942), held that rules as to the order of introducing
topics of evidence are directory and not mandatory.
The Court went on to say that an alteration in the
prescribed order is allowable in the discretion of
the court.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The above rule applies in the case where
there is a confession or admission along with the
necessary corroborating evidence*

In Murphy v.

State, 221 Tenn. 351, 426 S.W.2d 509 (1968), cert.
denied 402 U.S. 945, the Court held:
" . . . admitting the confession
prior to the introduction of some
evidence of the corpus delecti . . .
admits to no more than harmless error
where the corpus delecti is later
established." 426 S.W.2d at 514.
In State v. Hernandez, 83 Ariz. 279, 320 P.2d 467
(1958), the Arizona Supreme Court held:
"The [confessions] were
admissible in the event proof of
corpus delecti were ultimately
submitted. Whether it should be
allowed at the particular time is
merely a matter of the order of
proof and not of its admissibility."
For similar holdings in other states see People v.
Cantrell, 105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256 (1973);
State v. Smith, 12 Wash.App. 720, 531 P.2d 843 (1975);
and Mcintosh v. State, 86 Nev. 133, 466 P.2d 656
(1970).

The rule is summed up in McCormick on

Evidence, page 347:

-12-
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"Because of the trial
court's discretion over the order
of proof [the usual rule that
corpus delecti be established
prior to admission of a confession]
is for practical purposes not a
condition of admissibility, but
rather . . . a formulation of the
required proof to take the case to
the trier of fact or to sustain a
finding of guilt."
Therefore, the real issue is whether or not
the State was able to corroborate the admission of the
appellant.

Respondent submits that there is more than

adequate evidence to so do. A highway patrol officer
testified that only one other person was riding in
the vehicle with the appellant.

This other person was

sitting on the passenger side of the Chevrolet truck
when the officer first observed him (T.16).

This other

person was bleeding quite heavily and there were pools
of blood on the passenger side of the truck (T.17,44).
As for the appellant, he only had one small cut by his
eye (T.46).

The officer further testified that the

door on the passenger side was so damaged that it could
not be opened (T.43).
It is impossible to view this evidence in
any way other than in a manner which proves beyond all

-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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doubt that appellant was the driver of the truck.
For appellant to have been the passenger would have
required that he have removed the injured man from
the driverfs seat, gotten out of the truck on the
driver's side and then put the injured man back in
the truck through the driverfs side and then have pushed
him back over to the passenger sider and all this while he
kept the injured man from bleeding until he got to the
passenger side.

This would have been a difficult task

even if appellant had been sober.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that there was more than
sufficient proof of the corpus delecti.

Further, it

does not matter in what order the proof comes in,
particularly where the court is sitting without a
jury.

Finally, although the Automobile Homicide Statute

requires no more than a showing of simple negligence, the
State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was
criminally negligent.

His conviction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General

/

'

.

,

-

•

-

.

•

'

•

'

'

•

,

•

•

'

•

•

•

•

•

'

.

•

.

•

WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

